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 Detailed appraisal
of the European Commission's Impact Assessment
Rules concerning third countries’ reciprocal
access to EU public procurement
Commission proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public
procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and
services to the public procurement markets of third countries (COM(2012) 124 final)
ANNEX III





Direct benefits for SMEs from the proposed Regulation look limited at best, while
indirect impacts appear probable. The 5 Mio EUR proposed for the threshold is
similar to pre-existing public procurement thresholds and implies that only a
small subset of contracts will be covered by the regulation which may impact its
effectiveness. Contracting authorities have no incentive to refer procedures to the
Commission. Spain has reciprocity clauses but there is no evidence of their
widespread use.
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Executive summary
European SMEs tend to bid mostly for public procurement contracts within their home
Member State and for small contracts. Participation rates of SMEs in cross-border
procurement appear lower than their overall participation on the economy. The
Regulation proposed by the European Commission will target contracts over 5 Mio Eur
with a view of forcing the opening of public procurement markets in third countries. The
direct benefits for European SMEs will be limited if any at all. If indeed public
procurement markets are opened in the future, the potential benefits for SMEs will
mostly be available through sub-contracting and supply chain opportunities, areas that
third countries can easily close down with de facto protectionist measures.
Some impacts on SMEs of the proposed Regulation do not appear to have been taken into
consideration. Any SME participating directly (tenderers) or indirectly (sub-contractors,
supply chain) in the procedure will face transaction and opportunity costs due to the four
to eight week timeframes for decisions and any possible legal challenge.
All the solutions proposed by the European Commission could potentially lead to
retaliation from third countries and it is impossible to map out their entire scope.
Furthermore, irrespective of the solution adopted, it is not certain that retaliation would
only happen in the same public procurement markets. It is entirely possible that an
aggrieved third country could simply decide to retaliate on other trade areas with direct
impact on the European SMEs in that market. This may be the biggest risk for EU
companies as it could impact export led companies and even the operations of companies
inside Europe.
From the perspective of SMEs, other than maintaining the status quo, all options
considered by the European Commission imply transaction and opportunity costs.
However, had the European Commission adopted option 3A (legislative approach
without supervision) instead of 3B it would have at least reduced the timescales involved
and the number of decisions that may be subject to judicial review. The European
Commission could have also considered the option adopted in some Member States of
targeting the origin of the bidders and not the origin of the goods or services and again
some transaction and opportunity costs for SMEs could be avoided as long as it did not
imply a supervision procedure.
The proposed 5 Mio Eur threshold for the Regulation is similar to some of the current
thresholds applicable to European public procurement. By covering only a small number
of strategic contracts, it will reduce the transaction costs for contracting authorities and
the European Commission but may put at risk the effectiveness of the measure. If the
threat is not credible because it is seldom used, how will it force any trading partner to
negotiate? On the other hand, by reducing the scope of the application of this measure
the risks for retaliation are reduced.
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On the Impact Assessment working document the European Commission is forecasting
554 yearly referrals of public procurement procedures. This may prove to be too
ambitious, as contracting authorities have no incentive to refer a public procurement
procedure to the European Commission. This is due to the fact the costs of doing so are
certain, i.e. delays in the procedure, risk and cost associated with a judicial review or a
weaker field of candidates, wheras there is no obvious benefit for the contracting
authority. Therefore it is quite possible the actual number of notifications will be lower
than anticipated.
The exception to the previous reservation will probably be strategic or sensitive contracts
where the contracting authority may have an interest in having it awarded to a national
supplier. In that case, there is a risk the proposed Regulation will be used simply for
protectionist purposes and it is as likely that the target of the referral will be either based
on another Member State or on a third country.
Some Member States have developed specific “local mechanisms” that led different kinds
of national reciprocity clauses: i) excluding suppliers due to their origin (Austria, Italy
and Spain); ii) excluding tenders due to the origin of goods (Belgium); iii) exclusion of
access to remedies (United Kingdom).
There is no evidence of widespread actual use of reciprocity clauses in the Member States
that have them, nor are they a current topic in academic discussions or subject to
abundant case law. This lack of evidence of use or interest appears to be the key lesson to
be drawn: without incentives contracting authorities will not exclude foreign bidders.
No evidence has been found that the United Kingdom has a reciprocity clause other than
an apparent restriction imposed in the access to remedies by suppliers based in third
countries. Furthermore, in 2012 the UK Government has spoken against the proposed
Regulation in no uncertain terms citing the risk of escalating protectionism.
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1. Impact on SMEs
I – SMEs and public procurement
Participation by SMEs in public procurement has been seen for some time as an
important goal within the internal market (European Commission, 2010 and European
Commission, 2007) but so far have not entirely realised their potential. Between 2006 and
2008 SMEs captured over 60% of contracts but only 33% of the value for contracts above
the EU thresholds. The share of value secured by SMEs is between 14% and 21% lower
than their weight in the European economy, particularly for micro and small enterprises.
The current figures highlighted above are similar to the ones found for the period
between 2002 and 2005 (European Commission, 2007). This indicates two important
points for this report:
i) The capacity for SMEs to win public contracts above the thresholds within the EU
is plateauing;
ii) SMEs tend to win the contracts with smaller value above EU thresholds.
When taken together, these findings point out towards a rule of thumb regarding the
participation of SMEs in public procurement: the larger the contract, the less likely a SME
will be able to capture it. It is important to take this into consideration when talking
about SME participation in public procurement, particularly for contracts above 5 Mio
EUR, which is the threshold proposed by the Commission in the proposal being
analysed.
The EU thresholds currently have an established range from 130,000 EUR (certain
services and goods) to 5 Mio EUR (works), thus meaning that only the contracts over
those thresholds are harmonised under EU law. Contracts beneath these thresholds are
not harmonised and, with some caveats such as the cross-border interest test, it is up to
each Member State to regulate them.
By looking at the numbers, it is apparent that the bulk of EU rules do not apply to the
contracts of the size most SMEs would be interested in competing for. The higher the
value of the contract the higher the transaction and opportunity costs for a SME. When
taken together, these two put a small company at a disadvantage in comparison with
bigger tenderers. Furthermore, larger contracts tend to be tendered through restricted
procedure or competitive dialogue which are biased against new or smaller firms due to
the need to pick a pre-determined number of candidates based on their prior experience
or financial capacity.
In addition, the current thresholds and other exclusions leave out 81.4% of the total
procurement spend of the bulk of EU regulation. That is, the current procurement rules and
as a consequence the GPA, only cover a small percentage of the total procurement spend.
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In some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, participation of SMEs in public
procurement has led to the realisation that the only way to increase their spend capture
would be by increasing the advertising of lower value contracts and making them more
transparent. This was requested by SMEs (Welsh Government, 2009) and implemented
by the UK Government in 2011 through the creation of the portal ContractsFinder and
the obligation of contracts over circa 12 000 EUR tendered by certain contracting
authorities to be widely advertised. Between 2009/10 and 2011/12 the percentage of total
direct procurement spend with SMEs grew from 6.5% to 13.7%, with an aspiration of
reaching 25% by 2015 (Cabinet Office, 2012).
Taking into consideration the data provided above it appears that within national
markets SMEs prefer and are more successful in smaller rather than larger contracts.
Furthermore, regulatory and policy changes can foster their participation in procurement
markets. This should be taken into account when looking into the impact of the proposed
procurement opening policy, particularly as it will affect only contracts over 5 Mio Eur.
Regarding the participation of SMEs in cross-border procurement in Europe the data is
less clear but a number of baselines from available research (European Commission,
2010a) may be drawn upon. The first one is that overall cross-border procurement in
Europe is the exception and not the rule: only 1.5% of the total number of contracts
covered by EU regulations are won by firms based in a different Member State. These
contracts represent 3.4% of the procurement spend, once again indicating that they tend
to be of a larger size and therefore of less interest to SMEs. Taking into account the
conclusion of the previous point, it is probable that SMEs are under-represented in that
percentage. If European SMEs appear not to be taking part nor winning public contracts
in other Member States how can we expect them to win business in third countries?
Furthermore, the barriers to SMEs participation in foreign public procurement markets
across Europe are well known: difficulty to establishing subsidiaries, adapting to
different legal regimes and the need to do business in a foreign language. These are
recognised by the Commission in the Impact Assessment document accompanying the
proposed Regulation. They can be distilled into the higher transaction and opportunity
costs of bidding for public procurement contracts abroad, which serve as a deterrent for
SME participation. As only larger contracts are covered by EU regulations and as such
widely advertised, it is again arguable that the current regulation of public procurement
in Europe does not have a large effect on SMEs in terms of cross-border procurement.
The proposed Regulation does not address any of the issues previously identified and as
such it is likely that its immediate impact on the participation of SMEs in public
procurement at national, cross-border or international level will be limited even if the
objective of opening other procurement markets is successful. In other words, if there are
any immediate beneficiaries from the proposed Regulation, it will not be European SMEs.
Regarding the negative impacts however, the answer is different as they can affect SMEs
in many different ways (see next section).
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II – To what extent has the impact for SMEs been evaluated?
The Impact Assessment working document looks briefly into the potential impact of the
proposed Regulation for SMEs. Its focus is mostly on the difficulties facing SMEs in
public procurement (Impact assessment p.18) and the opportunities arising from
negotiations downstream for the opening of new public procurement markets (Impact
assessment p.28) if negotiations with third countries are successful (SME
internationalisation). Looking at the arguments provided, it seems plausible that some
European SMEs will benefit in specific sectors and countries if this regulation indeed
leads to the opening of new markets. The examples put forward of Portuguese SMEs in
Brazil or Polish SMEs in Russia appear reasonable as at least in the first case the language
and legal regimes are similar enough to justify the argument. However, no clear evidence
of such benefits is provided in the Impact Assessment.
In addition, those are indirect benefits that could be accrued by SMEs. Looking at the
limited success of cross-border procurement wins by SMEs within Europe it is apparent
that subsequent issues such as the language and legal requirements of the third countries
would have to be solved before European SMEs could reap the benefits of the opening of
new markets. These are uncertain long-term benefits.
If the Regulation was indeed successful in the opening of new public procurement
markets, perhaps that the biggest potential benefit for SMEs might be through the supply
chain of those larger contracts in third countries. This is an area that the Impact
Assessment working document does not shed light on unfortunately. One could argue
against this potential benefit in that it is one thing to open the procurement market (i.e.
the process that results in the choice of the contractor) and another the full blown
opening of sub-contracting or supply chain possibilities underneath. It is not farfetched to
imagine a situation whereby a third country could open a certain procurement market
but would keep trade barriers in place to ensure that local supply chains would benefit
from downstream work opportunities. This would not be covered by procurement
related agreements and does not seem to have been taken into equation in the case made
for the proposed Regulation.
As mentioned in the Impact Assessment working document it is possible that third
countries will retaliate on the procurement access offered to European suppliers before
starting any negotiations to strenghten their negotiating position. As such, European
SMEs already involved in public procurement may lose the access they currently enjoy,
either through direct participation or sub-contracting and supply chain opportunities on
larger contracts. As mentioned before, participation of SMEs outside their home country
is limited even within Europe but it is not unreal to foresee that in specific sectors there
may be SMEs directly affected by any retaliation measure.
The Impact Assessment working document does not refer to two important general impacts
that affect SMEs as well: i) inward impact, i.e. the impact that SMEs would face within
Europe if the Regulation goes ahead; ii) the risk of retaliation outside public procurement.
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1.1 Inward impacts
i) Increased timescales on public procurement procedures subject to the notification
procedure
In accordance with article 6(3) of the proposed Regulation, contracting authorities will
have to notify the Commission of an intention to exclude a supplier. The Commission
will have to produce a decision within two or four months of receiving the notification. In
consequence, a procedure affected by a notification can be delayed for a period of up to
four months. Any SME involved in the procedure either as a tenderer (unlikely due to the
high threshold value, unless if part of a consortium), sub-contractor or part of the supply
chain of any of the tenderers involved will suffer the same delays. It should be mentioned
again that transaction and opportunity costs in public procurement are felt more strongly
by SMEs and any delays to the conclusion of a procurement process will affect them
more than larger companies. As the procedure will be stopped for a certain period of
time, all tenderers, sub-contractors and supply chains will be affected and not only the
ones involved in the tender will be subject to potential exclusion. Therefore, the
suggestion of an opportunity cost of 3% for 6-8 weeks of delay on the tenderers affected
(Impact Assessment working document footnote 104) seems reasonable for larger
companies but understates the downstream costs on sub-contractors and supply chains.
These are the areas where the potential cost impacts for SMEs may be higher.
ii) Further delays due to legal challenges
In addition to the above, the creation of a new key decision within a procurement
procedure will also open the possibility for legal challenges to be brought by any of the
tenderers. For example, the tenderer facing exclusion may certainly appeal the decision
taken by the Commission and will have access to the full remedy system available within
the European public procurement legal framework. It will be entitled to apply for an
interim suspension of the decision or the judicial review which would further delay the
procedure.
Furthermore, it will provide the other tenderers with two opportunities to bring legal
proceedings as well. Firstly, if the Commission decision is negative the remaining
tenderers may decide to apply for judicial review of the decision. Secondly, if the
contracting authority decides not to refer a tender to the Commission for exclusion, any
of the remaining tenderers may also bring judicial review against such decision.
The risk for legal challenges will depend on the culture of each country and the specific
circumstances of the tender. For example, legal challenges in public procurement are
quite common in countries such as Portugal, Spain or Greece but uncommon in other
Member States such as the United Kingdom or Denmark due to cost or the cultural
issues.
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1.2 Retaliation by third countries outside public procurement
Third countries affected by the proposed regulation may also decide to retaliate outside
the field of public procurement in a more general trade dispute. There is no reason to
assume that any retaliation will be done on a like for like basis. In the view of the author
this poses a major risk that is underepresented in the Impact Assessment working paper.
If a third country wants to maximise the effect of their retaliation, it may be that the most
beneficial way for it to do so will be to target a completely different market. The obvious
targets would be sectors where European suppliers (including exporting SMEs) are already
operating and could stand to lose the access they currently enjoy. For example, in a scenario
based on the construction sector where the steel being procured for the construction of a
bridge is coming from a third country without a GPA agreement, if the Commission
decides to exclude the tenderer the third country might retaliate by banning imports from
European suppliers in the car industry or stop selling rare earth minerals to European
buyers. Any SME operating directly or indirectly on these sectors could potentially be
affected, including SMEs depending on inputs coming from third countries. In other words,
not only the external market would be at risk but also the ability of European companies to
keep operating at all in case their own supply chain is affected.
The legality of such retaliation may be disputed under WTO regulations but it would not
be impossible for this to happen and it would take a number of years to go through the
appropriate WTO mechanisms to solve the issue.
III – Are there some options more beneficial for SMEs than others?
The European Commission presented a number of different options before adopting
solution 3B, that is, a legislative approach with supervision by the European
Commission. All options involved trade offs and the case presented can be understood
with the caveat that no hard data was provided but only the subjective impressions that
led to the decision taken.
It is hard, if not impossible, to identify all the risks and possible consequences of any of
the options provided due to the unlimited dependencies and the fact that the actual
consequences will depend on the reactions from affected third countries. It is assumed
that the overall impact will be dealt with in more detail in another of the areas of the
questionnaire provided.
Although it is not advisable to focus the decision making process on the impact on a
single group of stakeholders or beneficiaries, it is still relevant to look at what might be
the consequences of the different options originally proposed on SMEs.
From the perspective of SMEs, the option adopted can lead to the aforementioned direct
and indirect impacts and costs. However, it would appear that all other options have
similar drawbacks. As the objective is to inflict some financial pain on third countries,
any of the solutions to achieve this aim can lead to retaliation either on the original
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market of the dispute or on a completely different market. It is quite possible that any
option, to be effective, will impose transactions costs directly and bears the risk the effect
of retaliation will be borne by unforeseen victims, including European SMEs.
It can be said however that any option (legislative or not) that did not include
supervision by the European Commission would reduce but not eliminate potential
negative impacts on European SMEs. For example, solution 3A, a legislative approach
without supervision by the European Commission would trade the delay imposed by the
two to four month decision timeframe with the possibility of more contracting authorities
unilaterally deciding to exclude suppliers falling into the conditions imposed by the
Regulation, particularly if said suppliers were foreign, i.e. based on other Member States
or from third countries.
In addition to solution 3A, another option that might reduce the transaction costs for SMEs
would be to adopt an approach similar to the one taken currently in Austria, Italy or Spain
(please see last question) where the exclusion depends on the place of incorporation of the
company. If this was a simply mandatory condition as currently imposed in some Member
States without interference by the Commission, only foreign bidders would be excluded
and at least some of the transaction costs could have been avoided.
.
Key findings
 European SMEs tend to bid for contracts much lower than the proposed threshold of
5 Mio Eur by the Regulation and they do not take part directly in most contracts
covered by it. Any SMEs participating in supply chain or sub-contracting roles in
tenders subject to the notification procedure would still be affected.
 Cross-border SME procurement participation is limited and Regulation does not
address any of the already identified cross-border barriers, as such it is unlikely
to have a direct positive impact for SMEs.
 Direct benefits for SMEs from the proposed Regulation other than supply chain
opportunities on larger contracts tendered in third countries seem limited and
even those are uncertain.
 Inward impact of Regulation has not been thoroughly explored in the Impact
Assessment working document and potential impacts not originally forecast can
be anticipated.
 Risk of retaliation outside public procurement by third countries has not been taken
into consideration. This poses the biggest risk for EU businesses including SMEs
 All solutions proposed by the European Commission could lead to retaliation
and other impacts on SMEs, but it is impossible to measure them with precision.
 From a perspective of the transaction costs for SMEs, option 3A (legislative
approach without supervision by the Commission) or a system like the one
currently in place in Austria, Italy or Spain that targets the origin of the supplier
itself would potentially affect less European SMEs. That does not mean that these
would be overall better tools to achieve the stated aim of forcing third countries
to negotiate access to public procurement.
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2. Justification of thresholds
I – Has the 5 Mio EURO threshold been assessed?
There is some logic behind choosing a single threshold instead of multiple ones for the
application of the proposed Regulation. Having multiple thresholds, as it occurs within
European public procurement, where there are different thresholds for different types of
contracts and contracting authorities would increase the complexity and the compliance
costs with the new Regulation. It could be argued however that if the objective was
indeed for the Regulation to be applied in practice it would have been preferable to
simply adopt the current multiple thresholds in force, as they cover many more contracts.
The 5 Mio Eur threshold appears to be aligned with existing relevant thresholds in public
procurement. For the award of works contracts covered by the Directives 2004/18 and
2004/17 the threshold is also 5 Mio Euro. In addition, the GPA thresholds for works
tendered by contracting authorities covered by Annex 1 (central purchasing bodies) or
Annex 3 (state owned enterprises and utilities) is 5 Mio SDR, which amounts to around 4
Mio Eur. Therefore, by adopting a 5 Mio Eur threshold it is guaranteed that only
contracts that are subject to the general EU procurement rules will be subject to this
Regulation as well.
The value of 5 Mio Eur indicates that the proposed Regulation is not to be used very
often in practice, as recognised by the European Commission on the suggested yearly
notification numbers. This raises a question surrounding the effectiveness of this
measure. To be effective, a threat needs to be used. Without a real threat of use it may
simply be irrelevant as a tool to force third countries to negotiate the opening of their
procurement markets directly. Even so, it may be a useful “bargaining chip” in more
encompassing trade negotiations, something that is not put forward directly by the
European Commission. For example, by having this Regulation in place it is possible to
force a discussion on public procurement in general trade negotiations and be offered as
a concession even if it has not been used many times against suppliers from a specific
third country.
It is unclear whether this specific threshold has been assessed but it would appear it has
been chosen as a compromise: it is high enough that will only apply to a limited subset of
strategic contracts and with a value similar to already existing EU public procurement
thresholds, thus limiting the compliance costs both to contracting authorities and to the
European Commission.
II – Have the reasons in terms of cost and benefits been assessed for setting up
this threshold?
Choosing a threshold value for the proposed Regulation implies a degree of trade offs
between competing interests as argued above. On the one hand, there is the ultimate
objective of using it as a bargaining chip for future negotiations and for that to happen
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the Regulation needs to be effective or at least appear to be effective and being applied in
practice. Otherwise it will be a proverbial “paper tiger”. On the other hand, the
consequences and implications for participants in public procurement (contracting
authorities, suppliers and the European Commission to a certain extent) need to be taken
into account.
The European Commission estimates that there will be 554 notifications a year for the
exclusion of tenders. The potential implications in terms of administrative burden are
well established in the Impact Assessment working document assuming the number of
notifications comes near the estimates (please see next question). If the Regulation was
applicable to lower value contracts the number of notifications would necessarily be
higher, increasing the transaction costs both for the contracting authority, the European
Commission and suppliers taking part directly or indirectly (sub-contractors or supply
chain) in the procedure. By having a lower threshold the number of notices could
increase exponentially as a much higher percentage of contracts would potentially be
covered. In other words it would not be focused on strategic procurement exercises but
would lead to an increased number of referrals, perhaps with an increase in the efficiency
(leverage) of the Regulation in future trade negotiations. A larger number of referrals
would also imply that more third countries would be affected and increase the risk of
retaliations.
The opposite is also reasonable. A higher threshold value would lead to a situation with
only the proverbial “tip of the iceberg” of only a limited number of cases being
potentially covered. As such, if only a limited number of notices were pushed every year
the Regulation would not create any leverage over our trading partners.
It is not clear from the Impact Assessment working document or the Regulation in itself if
the specific threshold of 5 Mio Eur was chosen as a value that would keep the negative
impacts (transaction and opportunity costs) low while maximising the efficiency of the
Regulation or if it was chosen as a benchmark value similar to threshold values already
existing in public procurement.
III – Is the estimation of the number of notification cases correct?
The European Commission estimates that the Regulation will yield around 550
notifications yearly across all Member States. Forecasting how people will respond to
future regulation is not an exact science and the case presented by the European
Commission does not detail the assumptions that lead to the proposed number.
However, some points are worth noting, particularly the issue surrounding incentives.
The key question to pose on this issue is what is the incentive for someone to make the
decision of referring a procurement procedure to the European Commission?
People react to incentives. For the contracting authority the regulation implies a certainty:
extra transaction costs due to the compliance costs and the round trip of the notification
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to the European Commission. In addition, it will have to factor in the risk that the
decision may be challenged in court, further delaying the procurement procedure. What,
then, is the incentive for a procurer to a) disclose on the tender documents the faculty of
excluding a tender; b) spend time assessing all the documentation and certificates on all
bids received to see if any should be referred; c) wait six to eight weeks for a reply from
the European Commission; d) face the risk of having the process derailed with a judicial
review; e) be left with a weaker field of candidates, thus potentially leaving it with a
poorer choice? The upside for a procurer is negligible while the downside, particularly in
terms of reputation risk for both the authority and the individual person leading the
procurement procedure is quite tangible.
There is only one situation where all the drawbacks of the regulation may be put aside
and that is if there is pressure within the contracting authority, namely political pressure,
to exclude a bid from a foreigner supplier. By foreigner it is meant both a bid coming
from outside the EU (the proposed target of a Regulation) and also a bid coming from a
company based in another Member State. There is a clear danger that this Regulation
may be used as a protectionist tool against all foreign bids and not only the ones from
third countries as intentioned. As it stands, the 50% test imposed by Regulation is
focused on the goods or services being supplied by the bidder and not the bidder
nationality. As such, any European bidder using inputs coming from third countries is at
risk of this Regulation. This risk can be minimised by amending the Regulation to make it
clear that it is applicable to suppliers based on third countries only. However, this
minimisation strategy introduces new risks, namely that third country suppliers will use
European companies as “straw men” when bidding or will create special vehicles either
in Europe or in countries not affected by the Regulation (i.e., GPA countries for example)
to side step it (please see next question).
The higher the value and the visibility of the contract the bigger the incentive to use any
tool available, even if illegally, to ensure the contract is won by a national firm. This is not
a farfetched scenario. For example, in a situation where a national supplier and one based
on another Member State present bids that would fall under the conditions imposed by
the regulation for potential exclusion, it is entirely possible that the contracting authority
will refer only the foreign bid to the Commission. The counter-argument would be that
this would violate the principle of equal treatment (it does) but how would anyone know
that if only the contracting authority has access to both bids? Unless the foreign bidder
has a good knowledge of the competition he may not be in a position to argue that both
bids should have been referred. This risk is not addressed by the European Commission
on the Impact Assessment working document.
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Key findings
 The 5 Mio Eur threshold is similar to some of the current thresholds for the
application of EU public procurement rules. It will cover a limited number of
contracts which may reduce its effect as a credible threat to force third
countries to open their procurement markets.
 The proposed threshold seems to be a compromise between having a threat
in place and the transaction costs imposed on contracting authorities and the
European Commission by being applicable to a small number of strategic
contracts.
 A lower threshold would increase the transaction costs for all involved
(contracting authorities, direct and indirect suppliers and the European
Commission) but at the same time make a more credible threat to third
countries. As a consequence, however, retaliation would be more likely.
 The estimated number of 554 notification cases per year seems ambitious.
The lack of incentives for contracting authorities to refer a procedure to the
European Commission do not appear to have been tackled. Referring a
procedure incurs on costs and downsides that are certain without any visible
benefit for the contracting authority.
 There is a danger that this Regulation will be used for protectionist
purposes, not only against bidders based in third countries but also bidders
based in other Member States, particularly on larger contracts. At a cost, this
risk can be minimised by amending the proposed Regulation as to apply the
50% test only to suppliers based in third countries. On the other hand, this
would open the door to third country bidders using European companies as
“straw men” or complex company structures to sidestep this solution.
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3. National legislation restricting access to public procurement
I – Is there any more detailed information available on the existing national
and regional legislation restricting access to public procurement?
The Impact Assessment working document put forward by the European Commission
states that some Member States have created national regimes for the exclusion of tenders
coming from tenderers based outside the European Union. The approaches taken by
these pieces of legislation vary from country to country but may provide some interesting
insights to potential use of the reciprocity clauses with the caveat of the widespread lack
of data or reliable information on their use. This limitation has already been pointed out
on the Impact Assessment working document. It should be noted that, in general, third
country access is not perceived to be a leading public procurement issue discussed either
in national academic circles or subject to significant national case law.
It is possible to organise the ways Member States have imposed reciprocity clauses in
three different approaches: i) excluding suppliers due to their origin; ii) excluding tenders
due to the origin of goods; iii) exclusion of access to remedies.
1. Excluding suppliers due to their origin (Austria, Italy and Spain)
Under this approach to reciprocity, Member States provide contracting authorities with
the possibility of excluding companies based on their place of incorporation. As such, a
Chinese company can be barred from taking part on a procurement procedure just due to
the fact of being incorporated in that country. In some Member States such as Austria
(and perhaps Spain), contracting authorities have the discretion to exclude or not
companies based on third countries. In Italy, however, the law leaves no scope
whatsoever for the contracting authority to make a decision to accept the participation of
a company incorporated in a country not party to the GPA or specific trade agreements.
In comparison with the approach taken by the proposed Regulation, the exclusion of
companies due to their origin has benefits and drawbacks. On the benefits side it
provides more certainty to the contracting authority than assessing the origin of goods. It
reduces uncertainty in the process as a simple transcript of the companies registrar will
sufice for the decision to be made. In addition, this approach cannot be used as a
protectionist tool against bidders based on other Member States, unless they are part of a
consortium that includes members from a third country. On the other hand, as argued in
the previous question, this is a system that can easily be defeated simply through the
creation of a vehicle on any Member State or country party to the GPA or a trade deal
covering public procurement. For example, the Chinese company could just incorporate a
subsidiary in Germany or Canada to tender for contracts in Austria, Italy or Spain. In
alternative, in contracts where technical or financial requirements are substantial it could
enter an agreement with an European partner to use it as a front on the bidding or an
existing subsidiary. Either way, these provisions are easily defeatable.
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Although at least in Italy the contracting authority is obliged to exclude suppliers
incorporated in third countries not covered by the GPA or trade agreements, there is
limited evidence of the use in practice of this provision. For example, it appears that only
one foreign company has taken this matter to the Italian courts so far (the company lost
the appeal).
The actual use of these exclusions is even more limited where the contracting authorities
have the discretion to exclude companies or not, for example in Austria and arguably in
Spain. In Austria, anedoctal evidence has pointed to the limited use of this tool although
it appears to be on the rise (albeit from a small base). There are not, however, reliable
statistics available to provide a more certain answer. In Spain, both the national and a
regional (Navarra) legislation allow for the exclusion of suppliers and there are no known
cases of this provision being applied in practice. That does not mean it has not been used
but there is a lack of doctrinal discussion or case law on this topic. Furthermore, even the
various procurement advisory bodies in the country have not been asked to provide any
guidance either.
This lack of evidence in various EU Member States with simple reciprocity clauses based
on the origin of the supplier which cover most of their procurement (goods, services and
works with values well under the 5 Mio Eur threshold of the proposed Regulation) seems
to support the argument made on the previous question: without incentives, few
contracting authorities will resort to exclude foreign bidders on the basis of reciprocal
access to procurement markets.
2. Excluding tenders due to origin of goods (Belgium)
Other Member States such as Belgium have introduced legislation barring bidders from
taking part on a public procurement procedure where a certain percentage of the goods
provided is coming from the countries not party to the GPA or specific trade agreements.
In other words, they have extended the current rules applicable to the utilities sector to
all public procurement. In comparison with the proposed Regulation it is worth noting
some differences.
The first difference is that there is no report process to an external authority. The
contracting authority takes the decision and it can be challenged in the courts, but is not
vetoed or approved by any other body as the Commission is proposing to do. This makes
the process simpler and faster as it avoids the delay involved with a second decision
maker.
Secondly, these rules are applicable to any goods supply or mixed contract covered by
the legislation. As such they will cover a larger number of contracts by being applicable
to contracts with a value well below the 5 Mio Eur threshold set in the proposed
Regulation.
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As mentioned in the Impact Assessment working document, the situation in practice in
Belgium is unclear as the 2006 public procurement law was expected to come into force
only in next July. In any case, the provision was already present in the previous 1993 law
but no evidence of its widespread use was possible to be found.
3. Exclusion of remedies access (United Kingdom)
Although not technically an issue of access to public procurement markets by third
country suppliers, the Impact Assessment working document refers to the United
Kingdom, where the current public procurement remedies legislation appear to exclude
the access to the remedies system to suppliers based outside the EU or a GPA signatory
party. The Impact Assessment refers to the existence of case law in the UK which
however was not possible to be found or analysed. The working document also correctly
mentions that in any case the use of remedies in the UK is quite limited in general.
However, particularly in Northern Ireland, the use has been increasing over the last few
years albeit from a very small base.
On a literal reading of section 47B of the Public Contracts Regulation 2006 (as amended
by the Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulation 2009) it appears to limit the access to
the remedies system to suppliers based on GPA signatory parties. There are some
reasonable grounds of uncertainty and the actual implications of these rules can be
disputed.
The Impact Assessment working document appears to take a literal reading of the UK
law as excluding any non-EU or GPA based supplier access to the remedies regime.
However, this literal reading disregards two important points. Firstly, it would violate
the principle of equal treatment as some bidders accepted to the tender would have
access to means of redress whereas others would be excluded just due to their country of
origin. It would be one thing for the law to allow the exclusion of tenderers from the start
based on their origin, as it is possible on some Member States, another to treat it
differently after he has been accepted to the tender.
Secondly, the literal reading implies also excluding suppliers from countries with trade
agreements with the EU or the UK but that are not party to the GPA, such as Chile and
Mexico.
In addition to the above reservations, the Cabinet Office has produced a public
procurement policy note in April 2012 (Cabinet Office, 2012a) criticising the proposed
Regulation as following a “tit for tat” approach that would lead to protectionism and
would not be conducive to the objective of opening the public procurement markets. This
appears to imply a very strong political view not only against the current Regulation
proposal but also against the protectionist spirit it seems to embody. As such, it would
not be surprising if the remedies rules would be amended as to make them clearly
applicable to all tenderers in case they have really been applied as a discriminatory
measure against bidders from third countries.
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II – Which mechanisms have been put in place and can any lessons be drawn
from this legislation?
From the previous section it is apparent that three different mechanisms have been used
to restrict market access or the access to remedies by suppliers based in third countries: i)
excluding suppliers due to their oirigin; ii) excluding tenders due to origin of goods; iii)
exclusion of remedies access.
There is no clear evidence that at least in Austria, Italy and Spain there has been an
extensive use of reciprocity clauses. In Austria and Italy there is evidence of occasional
use only but without any clear data or information that could be of use to draw lessons
from such use. There is also no evidence that many complaints have come forward
through the judicial review systems of these three countries.
A specific lesson from the apparent lack of use of reciprocity clauses can be derived
though. As argued in the question regarding the threshold value, even when contracting
authorities are left with a fairly broad discretion to exclude a bidder it is not certain that
they will do so if incentives are not there. It is likely that contracting authorities in the
Member States analysed simply see no benefit to excluding tenderers taking part in
public procurement procedures.
In addition to the above, regarding Spain, as this is a country where access to judicial
review in public procurement is relatively easy for aggrieved bidders, there is actually an
incentive for contracting authorities not to exclude tenderers in general (and specifically
on reciprocity grounds). This ease of access to the remedies system leads to risk averse
strategies that minimise the risk of challenges during the process. Not excluding
candidates is a way to reduce the risks of challenges. In what concerns reciprocity
clauses, the ease of access to remedies and the duration of judicial procedures may
actually function as a deterrent against their use.
Another lesson can be derived from the way Member States have introduced reciprocity
clauses in their national legislation. There appears to be a preference for targetting
suppliers themselves and not the origin of the goods being supplied. This is different
from the proposed Regulation where the deciding factor for exclusion is the origin of the
goods. This may be a relevant point for analysis as it avoids the problem identified earlier
with the proposed Regulation. By targetting the origin of inputs and not the supplier
itself, the proposed Regulation may be used for protectionist purposes against suppliers
based on other Member States. This risk does not occur with the current national
reciprocity clauses as only suppliers from third countries not covered by the GPA or
trade agreements are affected. However, as argued before, the national reciprocity
clauses can easily be side stepped by simply using a subsidiary based on any Member
State. For very large companies with subsidiaries it should be easy to just use an existing
one based somewhere in Europe. Even for medium sized companies it may be reasonably
easy to just create a vehicle in a Member State just for the purposes of tendering within
the EU Member States with a reciprocity clause that targets the origin of the supplier.
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Key findings
 The local mechanisms developed by EU Member States lead to three
different kinds of reciprocity clauses: i) excluding suppliers due to their
origin (Austria, Italy and Spain); ii) excluding tenders due to the origin of
goods (Belgium); iii) exclusion of access to remedies (United Kingdom).
 There is no evidence of widespread use of reciprocity clauses in Member
States such as Austria, Italy or Spain. In the first two cases the use seems
limited and in the third non-existent.
 The lack of evidence of the use of reciprocity clauses appears to be the key
lesson to be drawn from this legislation: without incentives contracting
authorities will not be excluding foreign bidders.
 No evidence that the United Kingdom has a reciprocity clause other than
apparent restriction imposed in the access to remedies by suppliers based in
third countries. Furthermore, the Government has spoken against the
proposed Regulation in no uncertain terms.
 National reciprocity clauses (Austria, Italy and Spain) appear to target the
origin of the supplier and not the origin of the goods being supplied as it is
the case with the proposed Regulation. This approach avoids the risk of
being used for protectionist purposes against bidders based on other
Member States but can easily be avoided by the creation of subsidiaries or
similar strategies.
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